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Nonpecuniary damage is the legal term for both some non-economic loss and
the monetary compensation of this loss. The term sounds like a paradox. Indeed,
it unifies, on the one hand, hard material value, and on the other, an emotion
impossible to quantify: sufFering. In spite of this philosophical argument, how-
ever, the paradox has to be solved in at least one practical context: the assign-
ment of monetary compensation to victims harmed by a liable third person. The
question is: How much has, and will, the victim suffer(ed) and, accordingly, how
mach money should they obtain to "repair" the damage? This judgment requires
that grief be expressed in a monetary value. But, how can this translation of grief
be made in monetary terms? Also, who is qualified to make this assessment?
That is, who is taken äs the expert in the present practice, and who should be
considered so, in this legal procedure?
The analysis of this problem proceeds in three parts: First, we question what
the legal concept of "nonpecuniary damage" is, and what the implications for
making this assessment are. We will show that the assessment consists of two dif-
ferent aspects, which we will call subjective and objective aspects. Second, we
question who is the expert, and for which aspect of the assessment? In this sec-
tion, we present some data comparing the assessment by courts and laypersons
on the severity of injuries. Third, we present arguments for a standardization of
this assessment, and discuss the debates on such a standardization, considering,
from a sociological point of view, the role and interests of the actors involved.
Our study focuses on the Dutch law and the Situation in the Netherlands. How-
ever, the problem of translating victims' suffering into a quantified amount of
damage, to be paid by a liable party, exists in most Western societies. Conse-
quently, our analysis may be generalized, to some extent, beyond the country's
frontiers.
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The Legal Philosophy of Nonpecuniary Damages
The Article 6:106 of the New Durch Civil Code (19921) reads:
The victim has the right to fairly determined reparation of härm other than
economic damage:
a. if the person liable had the Intention to inflict such non-economic härm;
b. if the victim has suffered physical injury, injury in honor or reputation, or
if this person has been otherwise afflicted.
However, this text reveals a few intentions the legislature had about nonpecuni-
ary damages. Although nonpecuniary damages can be awarded in a large num-
ber of cases (mentioned above under b.), we focus on the cases in which the vic-
tim has suffered physical injury. First, it is meant äs reparation of härm. In other
words, these damages should compensate for something that is lost. This implies
that the amount of damages, somehow, should be in accordance with the
amount of what is lost. Second, the damages, being reparation of härm, are not
intended to punish the person liable for the härm. This clearly contrasts with the
idea of "punitive damages" which exists in some common law Systems. However,
the damages vary äs a function of the degree of liability of the wrongdoer. As the
act was less intentional, the damages decrease (Dutch Civil Code, Article 6:982).
A third idea behind the regulation of nonpecuniary damages in the Dutch law is
that, äs a principle, they cannot be assigned to relatives of a victim if the event
has led to the death of the victim. Indeed, since these damages are meant to
compensate the victim, allowing them to "buy new pleasure" to replace the lost
one, other persons than the victim cannot, in principle, use these damages to
assuage the inflicted härm (Stoiker, 1990). This implication, however, is highly
debated (Lindenbergh, 1998). Indeed, occasionally, the härm might not inflict
the victim himself, but the relatives. This is so when the victim dies or stays in
coma. In the following, we will come back to this debate. Fourth, the judge, äs
Article 6:106 of the Dutch Civil Code3 reads, who has to determine the amount
of nonpecuniary loss, is given no more concrete instructions than that they
should determine this amount in a "fair" way. But, what is fair? To answer this
question, we first deal with the question of who is qualified to determine the
seriousness of injuries.
1 Nieuw Nederlands Burgerlijk Wetboek—New Netherlands Civil Code, translation in Eng-
lish and French by P. P. C. Haanappel & Ejan Mackaay, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
Deventer/Boston 1990.
2 Seefootnote 1.
3Seefootnote 1.
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Who Is Expert for Assessing Nonpecuniary Damages?
The law states that the assessment should be equitable. Moreover, in Article 6:97
of the Dutch Civil Code,4 it grants the judge the freedom to "estimate these
damages when no precise calculation can be made." But, what considerations
should play a role in this estimation? On the one hand, there is the suffering.
The Dutch Supreme Court ruled in the famous "AIDS Judgment" (19925), a
case in which a patient was infected with the HIV virus due to a medical error,
that compensation of nonpecuniary damages should be related to the "kind,
duration, and intensity of the pain, suffering, or loss of joy in life." This judg-
ment again reflects the concept that nonpecuniary damages aim at compensating
for personal suffering. On the other hand, the legal practice is that courts base
the assessment of the damages on the kind and intensity of the injury, rather
than on the actual pain experienced by the individual victim, which can be two
completely different assessments, äs we will see below. To assess the "intensity" of
an injury, courts apply a list of injuries, categorized with regard to their serious-
ness, in categories varying from mild to extremely severe.
This "list" is constructed on the basis of case law; a compilation of hundreds
of judgments on nonpecuniary damages from all Dutch courts, the so-called
ANWB list (composed by the Dutch Motorists Association [ANWB]). In turn,
this database of past amounts assigned has become the informal Standard to
courts for determining damages in future cases. How did this "list" derive? Be-
fore the "list" existed, courts decided in each case on the basis of their estimation
of the victim's suffering. From 1957 onward, decisions on nonpecuniary dam-
ages were systematically registered by the ANWB and, importantly, categorized
and ranked according to injury. The result is a hierarchy of groups of injuries and
corresponding monetary amounts, reflecting the average damages assigned in
cases in which a particular injury was suffered. In sum, the seriousness of in-
juries, äs estimated and inferred from past judgments, now predominantly deter-
mines the practice of the assessment of nonpecuniary damages by courts, rather
than individual suflfering aspects.
Interestingly, those two factors (personal suffering and injury) can conflict.
Indeed, focusing on the intensity of pain implies that the subjective individual
experience is taken äs the ground for the "loss" that should be compensated. We,
therefore, will call the victim-related factor the "subjective aspect." By contrast,
taking the injury äs the Standard implies that the objective observable result of
the event is to be compensated. Accordingly, the injury-related aspect will be
called the "objective aspect." Consider, äs an example, two victims from different
accidents, resulting with the same injury: an amputated leg. According to the
courts' actual practice, in which the injury is taken äs the relevant factor, those
two people should obtain the same amount of damages. The subjectively feit
pain, however, may vary greatly between victims, depending on the unique indi-
"* See footnote 1.
5 HR 8 July 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, 714.
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^ See footnote 1.
5 HR 8 July 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1992, 714.
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viduai and the event. This uniqueness can derive from numerous circumstances,
for example, relating to personal characteristics, such äs age, sex, and profession,
but also from die attitude of the actor regarding the event. The implication of
this is that if their suffering is different, the amount of damages should be, too.
Summarizing, the objective factor satisfies the fairness principle in justice that
people with the same injury should be compensated equally. The subjective fac-
tor satisfies die adequacy principle that the damages should reflect, adequately,
the actual amount of subjective lost joy.
How do courts come to terms with this contradiction? In the argumentation
preceding the final decision on the damages in court or in settlement, the subjec-
tive aspects of the suffering are often highly emphasized, especially by the vic-
tims' lawyers. Particular individual circumstances and feelings are argued to in-
teract and add up to the injury itself, increasing the victims suffering. However,
research has shown that judges do not allow their judgments to be influenced
much by these arguments. They generally adhere to the "list." It has been shown
in a statistical analysis of court decisions (Ferwerda, 1987; Vollbehr, 1989) that
the final decision on the amount of damages is hardly influenced by subjective
circumstances of the victim. The objective factor "seriousness of the injury"
almost fully determines die variance of the judgments.
The fact that the estimations of damages by courts barely take into account
subjective particularities of the suffering may have two reasons: First, some of
these circumstances are very difficult to assess because they require the valuation
of some very personal feelings. Second, what are the reasonable subjective cir-
cumstances to take into account? In the literature, many factors have been ad-
vanced (Stoiker & Poletiek, 1998), among which are income and social position
of the victim. But, audiors disagree äs to which individual characteristics are rel-
evant for assessing the damages (Lindenbergh, 1998). The third reason may be
that courts just do not know how these characteristics should affect their judg-
ment. For example, is a high income a reason for increasing or radier lowering
die damages? Should it be assumed diät rieh persons suffer less or more than
poor persons?
The objective factor, the severity of the injury, has to be assessed in a different
way dian the subjective factor. The injury itself can often be determined by a
diagnosis from a medical expert. However, the problem is to determine its "in-
tensity" (seriousness) compared to other injuries. Vollbehr (1989), Pieters and
van Busschbach (1989), and Stoiker and Poletiek (1998) point at the arbitrary
character of the "seriousness categorization" of the injuries on the ANWB list.
This database reflects what courts consider about the seriousness of injuries, both
relatively (one injury äs compared to the others) and absolutely (each injury is
supposed to correspond to a certain amount of loss in the joy of life, monetarily
expressed). This raises the question äs to who is the expert in assessing the rela-
tive and absolute severity of healdi damages. We consider three possibilities: first,
the court. This is the point of view taken implicitly by our legal system, because
this is the practice. The courts base their decisions on the "list," which in turn is
a compilation of court judgments. However, apart from making an accurate esti-
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mation of the damages, courts might have other concerns. For example, courts
may tend to keep the seriousness low in order to avoid case laws with huge mon-
etary amounts on the basis of which new victims might base new claims. Also,
their estimations on the seriousness of injuries might be affected by factors, such
äs social Status, which is generally above average for judges. Notice, that these
considerations only apply to non-jury Systems. Second, the victims themselves
might be considered äs the expert in determining how serious the injury is, abso-
lutely äs well äs relatively, in comparison to other injuries. However, the victims
are influenced by other subjective factors, which might bias their estimation. For
example, the very fact that the victims can claim monetary compensation might
bias their perception of the seriousness of the injury. The third possible expert is
uie possible vicum, being the civilian to whom this legislation applies. We believe
that they are the experts on whose judgment the estimation of the seriousness of
injuries should be based, in order to be most in accordance with the legislation.
Indeed, possible victims are expected to be least prone to maximize or minimize
the estimated seriousness of injuries, for Strategie reasons. Thus, the Standard on
which the court bases its estimation of seriousness of injuries should reflect the
feelings of "the person on the street" (being the possible victim) about relative
and absolute seriousness of injuries.
In the study we present below, we further investigated this point of view by
comparing the courts' (ANWB list) and civilians' estimations on the seriousness
of their injuries. Such a test of the "list" has never been performed, although dif-
ferences in the estimations courts and people use might have serious financial
implications for victims, depending on whose expertise is used äs a basis.
Comparing the Courts' Estimations With Laypersons'
Estimations
The problem of the assessment of the seriousness of injuries can be formulated
in psychological terms, such äs how to measure Utilities of health states. In the
field of medical decision making, this is an elaborate research program. Indeed,
cost efifectiveness analyses of medical interventions require that the patients' ex-
perienced health states be quantified, in order to compare the costs of interven-
tions with their benefits in terms of experienced quality of life (Bakker & van der
Linden, 1995).
The methods applied to measure Utilities of health states can also be used in
the context of the legal assessment of nonpecuniary damages. We will first inves-
tigate the relative Utilities of injuries (ranking) by laypersons, which can be
directly compared with the courts' Standard. Next, we estimate the absolute Utili-
ties of the injuries. These Utilities can be compared with the actual average
amounts of nonpecuniary damages assigned by courts in the past, äs they figure
in the Standard "list." We also measured the Utilities of a number of events for
which no nonpecuniary damages can legally be claimed. These are the cases in
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which a relative (e.g., child, partner) has died due to some event for which a
third person is liable (Article 6:108 of the Dutch Civil Code6) and cases in
which the victim is in permanent coma. The latter cases are not explicitly ex-
cluded from the right of nonpecuniary damages by the law, but they are gener-
ally interpreted to be so by legal experts (Stoiker, 1990). Since these cases (death
of relative, permanent coma of victim) are the topic of a lively public discussion,
we investigated them in our study.
The Ranking of Injuries
Ninety-one persons participated in this study on a voluntary basis. The partici-
pants completed a questionnaire with 19 descriptions of injuries. The injuries
were a selection of those mentioned in the ANWB list, plus 3. These are "the
death of one's child," the "death of one's partner," and "being in permanent
coma." Participants were requested to rate the impact these injuries would have
on their quality of life, on a scale varying from 0 (no influence on my quality of
Tablel
Ranking of Injuries According to Seriousness by Participants (N= 91)
Thurstone score
Brokenteeth 1.58
Amputation of fingertip 1.27
Lost sense of smell 0.69
Lost sense oftaste 0.67
Large scar on the iace 0.46
One-sided deafness 0.45
Light whiplash 0.44
Forgetfulness/concentration problems 0.05
Change of charactet; irritability -0.04
Depression -0.12
Amputation of one arm -0.40
Mutilationof theface -0.45
Severe whiplash -0.47
Amputation of one leg -0.81
*Death of a partner -0.86
Incapacity of(non) verbal communication -0.88
* Death of own child -0.94
Paralysis of both legs -1.03
*Permanent coma -1.28
* Injuries that ate not liable for compensation under the present Dutch law on nonpecuniary dam-
ages.
6 See footnote 1.
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life) to 9 (my quality of life would be äs much affected äs by death). The rating
scores were analyzed by means of the Thurstone Method. With this method,
not only the ranking of the injuries of all participants can be calculated, but also
the "distances" between the injuries on the criterion "influence on quality of
life" can be inferred. This is obtained by calculating a z-score for each injury.
This z-score becomes negative when severe, and positive when not. In Table l,
the ranking of the injuries by participants and the corresponding Thurstone
Scores are displayed.
The Standard "list" is represented äs a ranking widi discrete categories. The
injuries belonging to one category share the same position in the ranking. The
ranking globally matches the courts' ranking. There are some differences, how-
ever. In order to compare the continuous participants' ranking with the courts'
categorization, a difference between the two "lists" was defined äs significant
when two injuries, ranked in a certain order by participants, were inversely as-
signed to two courts' categories. First, participants rate loss of taste to be less
severe than a severe whiplash, the courts hold the reverse. Another difference ex-
ists with regard to a "scar in the face." According to the courts, this should cause
less suffering than the amputation of the middle finger. However, according to
the participants, the inverse is true. With regard to loss of taste and smell, there
is also disagreement between the courts and the respondents. These two injuries
are estimated äs less painful than a large scar on the face, a light or severe whip-
lash, and one-sided deafness, whereas the courts put loss of taste or smell in a
more severe category than these. Finally, it can be seen that die three events not
"repairable" by damages according to the law, are considered most serious by lay-
people, placing them at the bottom of the ranking in Table 2. Loosing one's
partner, one's child, and being in permanent coma are feit äs the most painful
events that can happen.
How can these differences be explained? We suggest some tentative explana-
tions. First, whiplashes can affect victims in many ways. They can cause various
somatic äs well äs psychological effects, which are difficult to diagnose. In addi-
tion, this injury has obtained much attention from the media, precisely because
of its poorly explained and sometimes dramatic effects on victims. Courts might
estimate the impact of such "sott" injuries lower than people do. Inversely, loss of
taste or smell are injuries that are possibly not well imaginable by people because
they are not very frequent, and, dierefore, are estimated low. Courts, however,
have been faced more frequendy widi these injuries and estimate their seriousness
higher on the basis of life reports from victims. Sears that are visible do not affect
one's physical health, but possibly one's identity and self-image. Apparently, such
an injury is more important for people than courts believe. The same argument
might apply to whiplashes: Courts might think of diese psychological effects äs
fuzzy and, therefore, underestimate dieir seriousness. With regard to the ratings
of the events, which are not compensable by damages, we return to them below.
Apart from the ranking of injuries, we compared the absolute monetary
amounts associated to these injuries by both groups. For this, we used the "Will-
ingness-to-Pay" (WTP) Method. With this method, die psychological value of a
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"good" or a "loss" can be measured. It is frequently used in medical decision
making for measuring the Utilities of health states (O'Brien & Viramontes,
1994). It proceeds äs follows: People are asked how rauch they would be willing
to pay to be entirely cured from injury or iilness. Their answer expresses the esti-
mated amount of suffering in monetary terms. In the present study, we asked the
respondents to give their WTP value for two injuries only: the one they rated äs
the least severe and the one they rated äs the most severe. The mean least severe
WTP score and the mean most severe WTP score were taken äs the extreme val-
ues of the Utilities accorded to the average least and most severe injuries. The
WTP amounts for the remaining injuries were obtained by Interpolation. The
intervals between the injuries were calculated on the basis of the Thurstone
scores obtained in the ranking. Thus, the distances between the injuries, calcu-
lated with the Thurstone scores, were reflected in the estimated WTP scores.
These scores are displayed in Table 2, together with the mean damages awarded
by the courts for each category of injuries. The amounts in Dutch guilders, were
converted to Euro.
Table 2
WTP Values of Injuries (N= 91) and Average Damages Awarded by Courts
(in Euro)
Injury categories accord-
ing to Standard "list"'
Mild
Very light
Light
Serious
Very serious
Extremely serious
Injuries
Broken teeth
Large scar on face
Light whiplash
Amputation of fingertip
One-sided deafness
Severe whiplash
Lost sense oftaste
Lost sense of smell
Forgetfulness
Change of character
Depression
Amputation of one arm
Amputation of one leg
Paralysis of both legs
Mutilation of face
Comrnunication problcm
*Death of a partner
*Death of own child
*Permanent coma
Average amounts assigned
damages by courts
1,364-2,500
2,500-6,818
6,818-13,636
13,636-25,000
25,000-50,000
> 50,000
WTP
Values
2,672
46,228
47,006
14,727
46,617
82,396
38,061
37,284
62,214
65,673
68,785
79,674
95,618
104,174
81,618
98,340
97,363
100,674
113,897
* Injuries that are not liable for compensation under the present Dutch law on nonpecuniary dam-
ages.
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As can be seen in Table 2, the average WTP scores resulting from this inter-
polation are higher than the damages. The differences between the two "lists" in-
dicate that courts associate less compensation with the injuries than civilians
would estimate to be necessary, given their seriousness. The differences especially
increase when the injuries are more severe. In the highest category, courts assign
an amount of 50.000 Euro or higher. However, this amount is only about half
the amount people assign on average to the most severe injuries.
A few remarks must be made with regard to the WTP Method. First, the re-
sponses are sensitive to income position. Indeed, people with a higher income
position may be willing (because capable) to spend more money for eure than
people with a lower income position, for the same suffering. In our sample, dif-
ferent income positions are represented, and the WTP scores are averaged.
Therefore, we chose to report the raw WTP scores. A second problem is that
quite a few participants (40) gave no specific amount äs a response, but answered
"millions" or "everything I have" when asked to rate the "most severe injury or
event." Those responses were excluded from the calculations in Table 2. We re-
turn to this in the next section.
The main conclusions from the present comparison of courts' with lay-
people's opinions on injuries are firstly that both rankings and absolute estima-
tions of the seriousness of injuries dififer on a number of items. Thus, consider-
ing civilian rather than courts äs the experts makes a difference. The values of
the severity of injuries expressed monetarily are, on average, almost twice äs high
äs the average damages from courts. Second, events not compensable by dam-
ages, such äs the loss of a partner or a child and being in a permanent coma, be-
long to the most painful experiences people can imagine: They correspond to
what people conceive äs the greatest loss of quality of life. This reveals the most
striking incompatibility between the court's attitude, on the one hand, and lay-
person's attitude, on the other, toward the seriousness of injuries. We discuss this
difference more in detail below.
Although courts do not even consider compensation for pain caused by dam-
ages to relatives, this pain is the most severe people can imagine. The law text on
nonpecuniary damages assumes that the victim of the event, for which a third
person is legally liable, is the one that should be compensated for the pain feit, so
that they can "buy" back the lost joy of life. Since a dead person cannot benefit
in such a manner from compensation, those victims are excluded from the right
to damages, äs follows in Article 6:108 of the Dutch Civil Code.7 In the same
line of argument, it has been proposed diät people in permanent coma (or their
relatives) should not be compensated either (Stoiker, 1990). However, our study
shows that the suffering caused to a relative by the death or coma of their partner
or child, is one of the most severe ones. The suffering being so intense, it seems
reasonable to compensate it somehow. Another argument in favor of damages
for surviving relatives is the Supreme Courts AIDS judgment8 on nonpecuniary
7 See footnote 1.
8 See footnote 5.
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damages. It rules that the suffering, its intensity, and duration are the entities to
be compensated. In this Statement, the court emphasizes that the sufFering,
rather than the victim äs a person, should be indemnified. In sum, in line with
die adequacy principle, according to which the amount of pain inflicted is what
should be compensated, it is arguable that relatives, if they suffer the pain ensu-
ing from the event having caused the death or coma of the victim, should be en-
titled to obtain some damages. This is in contrast with the adequacy principle
underlying the law.
Recently, however, in a so-called "nervous shock case," the Dutch Supreme
Court authorized die recovery of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages by
a close relative of a victim of a tort in certain situations.9 The claimant relative
must either observe the tort or be confronted immediately thereafter with the
suffering or death of the close relative. In addition, a serious mental injury (the
court uses the words "recognized psychiatric damage") on the part of the ob-
server claimant is a prerequisite and, therefore, the court in the case dismissed
the claim äs far äs "only" affective damage (bereavement damages—misery, grief,
sorrow) was concerned. Compensating mere affective damage would, indeed, be
in conflict with the general principle underlying the law on nonpecuniary dam-
ages (Levine & Stoiker, 2001).
A final remark must be made with regard to these cases. We observed that it
was particularly difncult for people to quantify suffering when the suffering was
extremely severe. This was expressed in the answers to the WTP question with
regard to the death of a partner or child. To our surprise, many respondents gave
unlimited answers, such äs: "everything I have." Damages are more difncult to
express monetarily äs the loss of joy of life is more extreme. Allowing for com-
pensation in these cases again raises the problem: How much should this be? The
füll discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this study. But, a possible
solution might be to fix a symbolic amount for these cases, meeting the need for
some recognition of the inflicted pain without trying to fully compensate it
materially.
Standardized Assessment: What Are the Advantages and
for Whom?
Resuming the previous arguments and findings, we propose that the assessment
of nonpecuniary damages is the combination of two aspects. First, an objective
aspect on the severity of the injury and, second, a subjective aspect which is the
actual individual suffering. These aspects are to be assessed and combined, re-
sulting in an amount of compensation. Although this assessment has, in the
past, been fully assigned to the competence of the courts, we have argued that
the assessment of the objective part should be based on the opinion of civilians.
9 Hoge Raad 22 Februaiy 2002, Rechtspmak van de Weck 2002, 48.
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We showed that transferring this expert role from the court to the civilians
makes a reasonable difference.
The present perspective on the assessment of nonpecuniary damages and the
expertise question, furthermore, raises the question äs to how this judgment pro-
cess might be carried out in practice. The two contrasting answers to this ques-
tion are, first, a standardized procedure and, second, individual judgments of
each case. The second method is the current practice in the Netherlands. The
severity of the injury, äs well äs the individual suffering, are weighted and esti-
mated in each individual case by the court and combined to one final monetary
amount. Interestingly, in the past, a few attempts were carried out to allow the
assessment of nonpecuniary damages to be defined by some kind of standardized
procedure. For example, in 1984, the Dutch Association of Insurers proposed a
"formula" for calculating the damages. It is a very simple algorithm calculating
the damages on the basis of the duration of therapy and recovery, the extent to
which the person is disabled (which are rather injury-related "objective" factors,
äs we called them), and the victim's age (which is victim-related and, therefore,
subjective). All these factors were quite easy to assess and were actually assessed
by the court. The formula, however, has hardly been applied in practice. The
algorithm was considered to be too simple and the amounts it generated too low
and quite arbitrary. In sum, it was seen äs equally arbitrary äs just using the
"list."
However, surprisingly, the criticism that this standardized procedure re-
ceived was not directed at the parameters of the formula, but primarily at the
very fact of standardizing the assessment. The criticism came from legal experts,
especially lawyers, attacking the procedure on the grounds of prohibiting proper
allowance for numerous subjective circumstances of the individual victim. In
fact, it is in the lawyer's interest to leave some untransparency regarding the
damages. This allows the lawyers, within the margins of this opacity, to plead
for maximization of the damages, on the basis of the unique Situation and char-
acteristics of their client and the Situation. Insurers, however, are interested in
predictability. Indeed, they are almost always the party who actually awards the
compensation. In order to calculate their premiums, they are required to per-
form accurate cost predictions. This is obviously more simplified when the para-
meters of the decision procedure are known, bearing in mind that it was the in-
surers who first proposed the "formula."
Finally, what are the consequences of standardization for the victims? The
law exists äs a regulation for the victims' right to fair compensation. On the one
hand, victims, äs a group, benefit from a transparent standardized procedure,
where standardization increases fairness. On the other hand, it has been sug-
gested that this procedure can also be applied against the individual interests of
victims. Their unique circumstances are, then, presumably dismissed. However,
there are also a few arguments in favor of a standardized approach for the indi-
vidual. Firstly, äs we mentioned above, courts in practice seldom take into ac-
count subjective factors, but base their judgment mainly on the severity of the
injury, apparently in spite of the subject-based pleas from lawyers. Thus, a stan-
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dardized procedure, in which a fixed weight would be given to objective and
subjective factors, might provide an improved, rather than a detrimental guaran-
tee that subjective aspects affecting the experienced pain are taken into account.
Secondly, however, subjective circumstances can also be applied against the indi-
viduals' interest. Consider a right-handed Illustrator having their left-hand para-
lyzed. Since this injury does not impede their professional work, the damages
might be lowered precisely due to their unique characteristics. In a procedure äs
the one sketched above, the individual and subjectively feit pain, on the one
hand, and the objective severity of the injury, on the other, can be balanced sim-
ilarly for all victims, allowing acceptable subjective elements to perform a role.
Another advantage of leaving the assessment of emotional damages to an "expert
procedure" is that it is intelligible and transparent to individuals, increasing its
acceptability (van den Bös, Lind, & Wilke, 2001).
In conclusion, standardizing the assessment of nonpecuniary damages might
be a reasonable way to translate suffering into monetary compensation. In such a
procedure the relative weight of the objective and subjective assessment, can be
calculated. However, expert roles should be adequately attributed, äs we argued.
Expertise for estimating the subjective factors should be provided by the victim,
and experüse for estimating the severity of the injury should be produced by the
possible victims, who actually are all civilian concerned by the legal system. In
our view, such a model allows for the difficult task of assessing nonpecuniary
damages to be performed in accordance with the intentions of the legislation.
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